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CASE COMMENTS
CONTRACTS-REQUISITES Or FRAUD, FOR WHICH E]QUrrY
GRxTs RTumF--STA~m.-Appellant owned land on which he
had executed an oil and gas lease, retaining one-eighth of the
product as royalty. He became dissatisfied with the operations
of the sub-lessee and employed appellee to institute suit to ex-
pedite the development. At the same time he sold to appellee
one-half interest in the royalty, accepting a note for the amount,
less $500 as the fee. There were producing oil wells on the lease
when the sale was made and appellant deposited to the credit of
appellee in a bank at Irvine one-half the royalties received,
until September, 1919, amounting to $300. When the note be-
came due appellee refused to pay it on the ground that appellant
had misrepresented to him the quantity of production and also
that the wells when pumped produced no water when in fact
they did produce a considerable quantity.
The evidence on these two points was conflicting but it is
clear that the purchaser did not disaffirm his purchase so long
as royalties were being received thereon. The purchaser also
testified that he would have completed payments and taken a
deed, if the royalties had continued until they equalled the pur-
chase price.
The court 'held that there was not sufficient evidence to war-
rant the chancellor in cancelling the note.
The courts in this country are uniform in holding that equity
will relieve one from contract that is shown to have been pro-
cured by fraud. But the relief will not be granted unless it is
shown that there was a misrepresentation of a material fact,
that the party knew or should have known that it was untrue,
that it was made for the purpose of inducing the other party to
rely on it, that he in fact did rely on it in executing the con-
tract, to his injury. Livermore v. Middlesboro Town Lands Co.,
106 Ky. 140; Hicks v. Walace, 190 Ky. 287; Merwin v.
Arbuckle, 81 Ill. 501; Morris v. Morris, 95 Ga. 535; Byard v.
Holmes, 34 N. J. L. 296; Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. Y. 400;
McAleer v. MeMurry, 58 Pa. 126; Marshall v. Hubbard, 117 U. S.
415.
In the case at bar it is obvious that the purchaser did not
rely on the misrepresentationq alleged, for there was no disaf-
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firmance on his part as long as the royalties were coming in,
He stood ready -and willing to complete the payments and take
the deed if the royalties had equaled the purchase price.
The holding in this case seems to agree with the great weight
of authority. (Cox v. Lfy, 200 Ky. 195. A. HE.
CRimniAL LAw-R-APFIR STATE IZNT AS DYnqG DE-
CLARATioN-DISCOVERY oF NEW EvDENCE APTER TE TRL.-
A man was shot, and believed himself dying. He made a state-
ment of the shooting to his attorney. Later he entertained hope
for recovery and consented to an operation. After the opera-
tion the man believed himself dying and reaffirmed the state-
ment that he had previously made. The lower court admitted
the statement as a dying declaration.
The evidence at the trial was conflicting. New evidence
that was likely to change the result of the trial was discovered
after the trial. Defendant excepts to the admission of the state-
ment, and asks new trial upon grounds of newly #iscovered evi-
dence.
Held: Statement admissible in evidence as dying declara-
tion. New evidence discovered after a trial in which evidence
is conflicting is grounds for a new trial where it will likely
change result. A new trial was granted.
Consciousness of impending death, shown by statement of
the deceased or abandonment of hope for recovery, is necessary
to make a statement of decedent admissible as a dying declara-
tion. State v. Thomas, 88 S. E. 20; Martin. v. State, 88 S. E.
20. The intervention of several days between the making of a
statement and death does not destroy effect of the statement,
where no hope of recovery had been entertained after its mak-
ing. Where hope of recovery had been entertained between
making of the statement and death, the statement is still admis-
sible as a dying declaration, if reaffirmed after hope of re-
covery has been abandoned. This is the general rule, and is the
Kentucky rule laid down in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky.,
68; and Wilson v. Commonwealth, 60 S. W. 400.
The authorities are in conflict upon the question of whether
new evidence discovered after the trial is grounds for a re-
hearing. It is a general rule that a new trial will not be given
upon the discovery of evidence that is merely cumulative and
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impeaching. Harris v. State, 88 S. B. 121; Crain v. State, 88 S.
E. 915; Ware v. State, 88 S. E. 303. Where evidence is known
that would change the result of trial, but not introduced, a new
trial will not be granted. State v. Somenschein, 156 N. W. 906.
This rule is general. In Knight v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky.
678 it was held that evidence not used for trial, but read for con-
tinuance, is not grounds for a new trial. So it seems that Ken-
tucky follows this rule.
Some states hold that whether a new trial is to be granted
upon new evidence rests in the discretion of the court. State v.
Newell (Minn.), 159 N. W. 827; Mosley v. State (Okla.), 157
Pac. 708. The New York Rule that newly discovered evidence
was not grounds for a new trial was changed by the adoption
of the code. The present rule in New York is that a new trial will
be granted if the evidence is such as will likely change the result
of the trial. People v. Steinlow, 161 New York Supplements
599. This rule seems to be the general rule and this case holds
this to be the rule in Kentucky, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 188
Ky. 391; Colson v. Commonwealth. E. R. J.
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIzuRES-W mE's CONSENT
TO SEARCH BY FEDERAL PRoHra-IToN AGENT DOES NOT WAIVE DE-
PENDANT'S IMMUNiTY No MAxE ADMISSIBm EviDENcE
OBTAINED BY UNLAWFUL SARc.-Defendant's wife consented
to a search of his premises by federal prohibition agents during
his absence. The search resulted in the finding of liquor and cer-
tain things necessary for the manufacturing of liquor. The lower
court allowed this evidence to be used against defendant and
through the use of this evidence he was convicted. The evidence
was not admissible and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Evidence found on a man's premises in his absence, even though
his wife consented to the search, is not admissible against him.
Such a search can be made only through the use of a valid
search warrant.
Two recent cases of identical facts have been held accord-
ingly. Commonwealth v. Duncan, Ky. report 250 S. W. 101, and
Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313. The court here said that
under the implied coercion there presented, there was no waiver
of the defendant's constitutional rights intended or effected and
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the evidence should be excluded. Polowick v. Commonwealht,
Ky. report 250 S. W. 102. J. W. C.
EASEmENT-SALE Or ONE o Two TRACTS WITH APPURTEN-
ANT EASEmENT PASSES EASEMBENT BY ImPLiCATION-REI
GivEN ON OBSTRUCTION OP' EASEMENT.-SUit to 6njoin the ob-
struction of a passway and to recover damages for its obstruc-
tion. Being denied the relief prayed for plaintiff appealed.
E sold lots to the plaintiff and later sold one to the def end-
ant, who erected a dwelling on his. There had for some time
been a passway or road through the lot sold to the defendant
that had been used in getting to the plaintiff's lots although four
of the lots of the plaintiff fronted on the same street as did the
defendant's. As the plaintiff's lots were rather high and a stone
wall had been erected by the street car company in front of
them this way was the most logical and inexpensive way that
the plaintiff could use. It had been used by E. for some time
before he sold the plaintiff his lots.
No right by prescription was shown because the plaintiff
had not used the way for the statutory period. Neither could
it be said to be a way of necessity because it was not impossible
to cut a way to the street through one of the plaintiff's lots al-
though it would have been very impractical. It is claimed under
the rule in this state, "that where the owner of an entire tract
of land, or of two or more adjoining parcels, employs a part
thereof so that one derives from the other a benefit or advantage
of a continuance and apparent nature, and sells the one in favor
of which such continuous and apparent quasi easement exists,
such easement being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of
the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication.
In Skaggs v. Carr, 178 Ky. 849, it was held that by the sale
and conveyance of a part of a tract of land connected with the
county road only by a pass way over the unsold part of the land
there was an implied grant to the use of this way, appurtenant to
the land conveyed. An action may be brought to enjoin the ob-
struction of this way. This implied grant will be considered
before looking into the case as to whether that is a way by pre-
scription.
In Stone v. Burkhead, 160 Ky. 47, it is held that where one
conveys a part of his land he impliedly grants the apparent or
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visible easements upon the part he retains which were used by
the grantor for the benefit of the part conveyed; they must
though be reasonably necessary for the use of that part.
These cases show that the rule mentioned above as to im-
plied grants is recognized by the courts of this state so the plain-
tiff is entitled to damages for the obstruction of the way she had
been using across the defendant's lot. Powers v. Ward, et al.,
Ky. reports 200 Ky. 478. J. W. C.
DIVORCE-CRUE, AND IauxA TR-ATMENT-CONDONATION.
-Plaintiff and defendant were married u 1904 and lived to-
gether till 1921, when the wife left her husband and brought
this divorce action on the statutory grounds of cruel and inhu-
man treatment and such cruel beating and attempt at injury as
probably endangered plaintiff's life or great bodily injury to her
from remaining with him. Defendant, in his cross-petition,
charged his wife with adultery and lewd and lascivious behavior.
The trial court dismissed both petition and cross-petition; plain-
tiff appealed and defendant cross-appealed. Reversed on origi-
nal appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal.
Because of the diversity of the several statutes, it is impos-
sible to adopt any universally applicable definition of cruelty
as a ground for divorce. It has been suggested that where there
is no statutory definition of cruelty, the interpretation should be
that by the ecclesiastical courts of England-'a series of acts
of personal violence, a menace to the safety of life, limb or health
or any determined threats of serious bodily hurt." A broader
construction prevails in the United States as a general rule and
Kentucky is one of a group of states which follows a yet more
liberal one. According to the modern view the question whether
defendant spouse has been guilty of legal cruelty is a question
of fact to be decided upon all the circumstances of the case--
Donaldson v. Donaldson, 170 Pac. 94-95. "Cruel and inhuman
treatment" is a relative term and depends upon the circum-
stances of each particular case-Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind.
412. The law does not require that acts of cruelty authorizing
a divorce should show that it is absolutely impossible for the
parties to live together as husband and wife. Extreme cruelty
under our statute may consist of words and personal treatment
and conduct short of personal or physical violence--osenfeU v.
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Rosenfeld, 21 Ia. 16. A systematic course of ill-treatment con-
sisting of continual scolding and fault-finding, using unkind
language, studied contempt and many other petty acts of a
malicious nature rday, if continued sufficiently long and when
producing sufficiently serious results, constitute cruel and inhu-
man treatment-Marks v. Marks, 62 Mmi. 212. This court has
repeatedly held that, personal violence, actual or threatened, or
even gross and abusive language is not absolutely essential to
constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. Reinhard v. Reinhard,
96_Wis. 555; 64 Am. St. 66. It is well settled by this court that
cruel and inhuman treatment, within the meaning of the stat-
ute, is not confined to acts of personal violence, but includes such
treatment as endangers the wife's health and renders co-habita-
tion intolerable-Gardner v. Gardner, 104 Tenn. 410. Under
the Kentucky statutes it is that species of cruel and inhuman
treatment that indicates such settled aversion to the wife as per-
manently destroys her peace or happiness and this character of
cruelty may habitually manifest itself in various ways that fall
short of assault or bodily injury and are not attended with ap-
prehension of violence or danger; and in the nature of the case
each complaint under this statute must be determined by the
facts as they are presented-Hooe v. Hooe, 122 Ky. 590. Any
conduct on the part of the husband or wife which is calculated
to seriously impair the health or destroy the happiness of the
other justifies an absolute divorce-McClintock v. Mc(lintock,
147 Ky. 409. There is no settled rule as to what is necessary to
show such cruel and inhuman behavior as to indicate the hus-
band's settled aversion toward the wife, except that his behavior
need not be violent or brutal-Burns v. Burns, 173 Ky. 105.
Cruel and inhuman behavior of the husband toward the wife so
as to indicate a settled aversion to her or destroy permanently
her peace and happiness and entitle her a divorce may consist
in -acts other than those of physical violence-Johnson v. John-.
son, 183 Ky. 421.
In the instant case the court followed decisions just cited.
However provoking the conduct of the wife may be, the husband
is not authorized to inflict on her corporal punishment, nor to
adopt a systematic course of ill-treatment towards her, con-
sisting of continual scolding and fault-finding and using unkind
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language toward her, and exhibiting a studied contempt for her,
since such a course may manifest "cruelty" within the contem-
plation of the statute as effectually as corporal punishment. If
he chose to condone her offense as he did, he could not justify
the cold, systematic, cruel conduct towards her referred to above.
Under Kentucky Statutes, 2120, cohabitation of the husband and
wife after knowledge of adultery or lewdness complained of
takes away the right of divorce therefor unless the continued
-cohabitation was under a promise from the guilty spouse to re,
pent and refrain thereafter from such conduct and that promise
is broken, in which case the original ground is revived. Boone
v. Boone, 200 Ky. 736. i. C.
DWoRCE-PRoPERaTY RiGHTs WmaE DwoacE NoT G~R~ m.
-Plaintiff brought this divorce action alleging cruel and inhu-
man treatment and such cruel beating and attempt at injury as
showed probable danger to her life or great bodily injury to her
from remaining with her husband. From a small store con-
ducted by them the couple had profited to the extent that they
purchased a comfortable residence, tho they continued to live in
restricted quarters over the store. The wife did all of the house-
work, often the washing, and also helped to run the store, thus
materially assisting in accumulating the estate. The Chancellor
dismissed the cause, indicating that on defendant's instituting
a proceeding for divorce he would be entitled to it and to be ad-
judged the sole owner of the above property, to which title had
been taken in the names of both parties at the time of the pur-
chase. Appellant insists that the judgment is erroneous in that
it denied her a divorce and the alimony incident thereto.
The trial court was of the opinion that the husband was
without fault. In this respect the opinion was largely based, as
stated therein, on the court's knowledge of the parties and the
witnesses. Giving to that finding All the weight to which it is
entitled, it is impossible to say that the husband was without
fault or was not equally responsible with the wife for the mis-
understanding. The wife is here held as failing to establish
the cause of action asserted in the petition and the judgment dis-
missing the complaint should be affirmed. There is however no
foundation in this record for the view that defendant is entitlecl
to a. divorce on the evidence adduced on this trial or to bo ad-
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judged the sole owner of property to which appellant holds the
title to an undivided one-half interest; for in an action for di-
vorce the respective rights of the parties in property which each
of them helped to accumulate may not be determined where no
divorce isgranted. Miller v. Miller, 200 Ky. 648. L. C.
Easements-Passway by Grant- Obstructions- Gates.-
The defendant granted a passway over his land to the plaintiff;
the land was fenced only on one side of the way. After twelve
years the defendant erected a gate at the point where the way
entered the public road. The grant did not give the defendant
a right to maintain or erect a gate across the way. The plain-
tiff brings this bill in equity to compel the defendant to remove
the gate.
The question in this case is: Whether a servient owner, in
order to preserve his land, may erect gates across a passway, let
by a grant, there being no provisions in the grant concerning
the erection of a gate? The general rule cited in 19 C. J. 986,
reads as follows: "The grant of a way without reservation of
a right to maintain gates does not necessarily imply that the
owner of the land may not do so, unless it is expressly stipulated
that the way shall be an open one, or it -ppears from the terms
of the grant, or the circumstances of the case that such was the
intention of the parties, the owner of the servient estate may
erect gates, or even bars across the way, provided they are so
located and constructed as not unreasonably to interfere with
the right of passage, and provided also they are necessary for
the preservation and proper and efficient use of the lands con-
stituting the servient estate, but not otherwise." Cases sup-
porting this doctrine are: Utal-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Rtephenso,
34 Utah 184, which holds that the grant of a way without reser-
vation of the right to maintain gates, does not necessarily pre-
elude the owner of the land from doing so, and unless expressly
stipulated that the way shall be an open one, or it appears from
the terms of the grant or the circumstances, that such was the
intention, the owner of the servient estate may erect gates across
the way, if they are so constructed as not to unreasonably in-
Aterfere with the right of passage. Ball v. Allen, 216 Mass. 469
where it was held that the owner of the servient estate might
fence the sides of the way and, when necessary, might erect at
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his own expense gates or bars across the way at the two entrances
thereof, provided they are not such as to unreasonably inter-
fere with the privilege of passage. Watson v. Hoke, 73 S. C.
361, holding that where the owner of the servient estate took a
right to use his land for agricultural purposes subject to a
private right of way, and consented and assisted others in laying
out the way across open lands, he could inclose them if necessary
by erecting gates for that purpose if they were not so constructed
as to constitute an unreasonable burden on the right of way and
Dyer v. Walker, 99 Wis. 404, which held: "That the easement
to a right of way having been acquired by prescription when the
land was unfenced, the owner of the land subject to the right of
way could erect a fence intersecting the right of way and put in
a gate of sufficient width where it crossed, the land on the
north side being pasture land, and on the south side being plow
land; and neither was suitable for any other purposes, nor unless
fenced apart."
The Kentucky decisions are in keeping with the above cited
cases, and the general rule is upheld in the following decisions:
Miller v. Petit, 127 Ky. 419; Raisor v. Lyons, 172 Ky. 315; Max-
well v. McAtee, 9 B. M. 20; Miller v. Miller, 182 Ky. 797; Brid-
well v. Beerman, 190 Ky. 227; Ford v. Rice, 195 Ky. 185. In
the present case the gates were necessary for the preservation of
the defendant's estate. Since there were no provisions in the
grant whereby the defendant surrendered his right to erect gates
across the passway, the case must be decided in accordance with
the general rule. The bill should therefore be dismissed, and
the judgment for the defendant be affirmed. Whitaker v. Yates,
200 Ky. 350. B. F.
EvmNcE-L nEA Qusnoxs.-In an action for slander
the attorney for the plaintiff, on a redirect examination of the
plaintiff himself, and on a direct examination of the plaintiff's
witness, read the exact words alleged to have been spoken and
then asked if those words were the ones spoken by the defendant
at the time and place alleged. The trial court below used its dis-
cretion and declared the questioning in this manner proper. The
questions here to be determined are: when can the discretion
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used by the trial court in allowing leading questions be reviewed,
and when should leading questions be allowed.
Notwithstanding the general rule against leading questions,
the matter is largely within the discretion of the trial court,
which may allow such questions to be put to a witness when it
deems such a course necessary and advisable, or refuse to allow
such questions where the circumstances do not seem to require
such a mode of examination. And unless there has been a palp-
able abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining
party, reversible error cannot be predicated upon a ruling of
the trial court as to allowing leading questions. Shlfer v. U: S.,
24 App. Cas. 417; Ind. R. Co. v. Maurer, 160 Ind. 26; Wise v.
Foote, 81 Ky. 10; Crenshaw v. Johnson, 120 N. 0: 270; State v.
Hazlett, 14 N. D. 490; Fisher v. Barber, 130 S. W. 871. We are
confronted with the inquiry in the principal case to whether
or not there has been a palpable abuse of the discretionary power
of the trial court in allowing the leading questions complained of.
It is not considered palpable abuse of the power to allow
leading questions where the witnesses are immature, ignorant,
illiterate, feeble-minded, embarrassed by the circumstances, im-
perfectly familiar with the English language, or hostile to the
party who insists on leading questions. People v. Harlan, 133
Cal. 16; Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702; State v. Drake, 128 Iowa 539.
Leading questions may also be allowed with perfect propriety
when to do so would aid the recollection of the one testifying
and incidentally when justice would be best served thereby.
Mann v. State, 134 Ala. 1; Gray v. Kelley, 190 Mass. 184; Borm
v. Rosenow, 84 Wis. 620; Fontz v. Hacker, 200 Ky. 233. De-
cided Sept. 25, 1923. E.E.S.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--EVWDENCE H1W CONPETENT AN
SUFFICMNT TO Snow CiTY's LmBnarz Pon IxJiuRY BY D IvEnTING
WArm.--Plaintiff owned a house and lot in Pikeville. The city
opened up, excavated -and graded a street above and adjoining
his premises. The work was done in such a manner as to divert
the natural flow of the water and cause it to flow over plaintiff's
premises, temporarily injuring said premises. A city ordinance
was introduced in evidence providing for the extension of "High
Street" which caused the injury. It was further shown in evi-
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dence that the work was done under the supervision of the city
engineer.
The court asked a witness, "Just tell what you think it did
really diminish the property," and the answer was: "Well, I
would say from $1,000 to $2,000." There was an objection to
this question.
The court held that (1), having shown that the council au-
thorized the opening of the street, and that the work incident
thereto was done by the city engineer, the evidence was not only
admissible, but clearly sufficient to show that the city was re-
sponsible for the injury, (2) that the objection to the question
should have been sustained since the issue was how much the
value of the use of the property had been diminished, for it was
of a temporary nature, and not how much the property itself
had been diminished,
As to the liability of a municipal corporation in the exer-
cise of its purely municipal functions, the corporation stands
upon the same footing with a private corporation and is held to
the same responsibility with a private corporation for injuries
resulting from its negligence, and is liable for the torts of its
servants or employees acting within the scope of such municipal
power. This is the rule by the great weight of authority. Hunt
v. Boston, 183 Mass. 303; Missano v. New York, 160 N. Y. 123;
Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54. And is in accord with the
decisions of this state.
Section 242 of the Kentucky Constitution provides, "Muni-
cipal and other corporations and individuals invested with pri-
vilege of taking private property for public use, shall make just
compensation for property taken, injured, or destroyed by
them."
Ever since the adoption of the present constitution the Ken-
tucky courts have held, in construing section 242 of that in-
strument, that cities are liable to abutting property holders for
injury sustained by the excavation of a street or the changing
of its grade or for any improvement that unnecessarily injures
or destroys the property. See City of Henderson v. McLain,
102 Ky. 402; City of Paducah v. Allen, 111 Ky. 361; Richmond
and L. T. Co. v. Mason County FiscaZ Court, 114 Ky. 351; Moore
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v. Lawrence County, 143 Ky. 448; Broadway Coal and Mining
Co. v. Smith, 136 Ky. 725.
While the citizen can claim no damages for mere inconveni-
ence that may result from construction and repairs of streets,
if the construction does interfere with private rights of a citizen
thereby causing injury, the city must pay damages for such.
The case of Kemper v. City of Louisville, 14 Bush 91, substan-
tiates this view. The injury must be unnecessary in order to
warrant a recovery. See Pearson v. Zable, 78 Ky. 170.
As to the amount of damages recoverable, this holding is in
accord with Ewing v. City of Louisville, 140 Ky. 726, which held
that if the injury is temporary, the measure of damages, if the
property be held for rent, is the diminution in its rental value
during continuance of the injury, but if it be occupied by the
owner, it is the diminution of the value of the use of the property
during that period. See also, P-ickering v. City of Louisville,
125 Ky. 213; City of Madisonville v. Hardman, 29 R. 253; City
of Pikeville v. Riddle, 200 Ky. 395. A. H.
STATUTES OF FRUDS-IMPLxsD GRANTS OF APPARENT AND
VISIBLE EASEMENTS UPON LAND RETAInED-WAYS OF NECESSrrY
-PRESCRIPTION.--The grantor owned a farm extending from a
county road to the crest of a mountain. The grantee owned the
adjoining farm extending from said crest to another county road.
The grantor conveyed to the grantee in 1889 part of his adjoin-
ing land, on the back part of which there was a passway leading
to the county road. This was seemingly not much used, but
was the ouly way of reaching that part of the farm. The grantee
opened a road from the land in question over his own land to the
other county road, but it was steep and could be maintained only
at considerable cost. The evidence clearly established the peace-
able and uninterrupted use of the passway by the grantee for
more than fifteen years subsequent to his purchase. Recently the
defendant, daughter of the deceased grantor, undertook to close
said passway on the ground that the use was permissive. De-
fendant claimed the use of gates, cultivation, etc., were evidence
of the permission.
The grantee testified as to a parol grant by the grantor, but
exceptions were properly sustained to this evidence under the
Statute of Frauds, as a parol algreement for a right of way is
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within the Statute of Frauds. Oak Grove Missionary Baptist
Church v. Rice, 162 Ky. 525.
The general rule is that where one conveys a part of his
estate he impliedly grants all those apparent or visible easements
upon the part retained which were at the time used by the
grantor for the benefit of the part conveyed and which are rea-
sonably necessary for the user of that part. Stone v. Burkhead,
160 Ky. 47 Lebzis v. Boston., 107 Ky. 98; Daniel v. Baxter, 112
Ky. 334; Mitchell v. Pratt, 177 Ky. 43&; Brookshire v. Harp, 186
Ky. 217; Bentley v. Hampton, 28 Ky. L. R. 1083. In the case
at hand the evidence is conflicting to whether prior to pur-
chase there was such a continuous use of the passway as to ren-
der it visible or permanent and it may be well doubted whether
it could be considered an appurtenance.
Where there is a conveyance of a tract of land and there is
no means of access thereto or egress therefrom except over the
remaining land of the grantor, a way of necessity over such land
of the grantor is ordinarily granted by implication of law. The
rule has been extended in Kentucky to the sale of a tract of land
entirely surrounded by other lands without means of ingress o'r
egress, altho not entirely surrounded by lands of the vendor.
An easement by implication is not dependent upon the continu-
ous use of a passway, but may arise where the grantor conveys
a tract of land entirely surrounded by other lands of his own or
others in which a way of ingress and egress will be implied by
necessity regardless of whether or not any open roadway existed
at the time. Estepp v. Hammond, 104 Ky. 144; Damron v. Dam-
ron, 119 Ky. 806.
In the present case if any but an adjoining land owner had
bought the section in question a way of necessity would have
existed over the remaining lands of the grantor in favor of the
grantee, but as the grantee was able to provide a way of ingress
and egress over his own land the determining factor was whether
the latter road was so inadequate as to render the one in con-
troversy necessary for the use of the purchased land. On this
point the evidence is conflicting. According to U. S. v. Rindge,
208 Fed. 611, a way of necessity cannot arise unless there is no
other means of ingress and egress; the right not being sustained
by mere proof that the way claimed is more convenient or de-
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sirable than some other way because of the mountainous char-
acter of the country. Bully Hill Copper Mining and Smelting
Co. v. Bruson, 4 Cal. App. 180; Watson v. French, 112 le. 371;
Bosch v. Hoffman, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 313; Rice v. Wade, 131
.Mo. App. 338, are in accord. The contrary view of Crotty v. New
River and Pocohontas Cansolidated Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, is
that a vay of necessity over the lands of a grantor is implied
where by reason of a physical obstruction to access, the grantee
cannot construct a road without an expenditure disproportionate
to the value of the land. The Kentucky court with Maryland
takes a middle ground. The test of whether one is entitled by
implication to a right of way over the lands of -another as a way
of neessity involves the question of reasonable access to the land
of the person claiming to be entitled to a way of necessity. Zim-
merman v. Cockey, 118 Md. 491.
-Even if the evidence should be considered not sufficiently
clear to constitute the passway as appurtenant or arising by im-
plication, these circumstances would indicate that the roadway
was being used under a claim of right and give notice of such
claim to the landowner and are competent to be considered in
that regard.
Where a passway was being used under a claim of right con-
tinuously and uninterruptedly for more than fifteen years a
right was acquired by prescription to the use of the passway, tho
the passway was crossed in several places by fences and was at
times cultivated. Brookshire v. Harp, 186 Ky. 217; Smith v.
Oliver, 189 Ky. 214; Felner v. Lawrence, 187 Ky. 384; Childers
v. Graves, 194 Ky. 780; Stephens v. Hdmblin, 195 Ky. 428. In ac-
cord with the above authorities is this decision of Elijah and
Wherter v. Holcomb, 200 Ky. 498. L. C.
STREET RAILROADS--STATE MbTOR-VEHICLES ACT DOES NOT
DETERMINE RIGHT OF WAY BETWEEN AUTOMOBILE AND STREET
CAR.-Appellee was injured in a collision between his automo-
bile and a street ear at the intersection of a street running north
and south with one running east and west in the city of Louis-
ville. The lower court rendered a verdict in a new trial for the
street car company. The second trial resulted in a verdict for
the plaintiff. The street car company appealed.
The trial court instructed the jury that the street car had
CASE COMMENTS
the right of way and that the Motor Vehicle Act of 1920 applies
to such cases. The first section of this act is as follows: "When-
ever and wherever the word 'vehicle' is used in this act, it shall
include all agencies for the transportation of persons or property
over and upon the public highways of this Commonwealth and
all vehicles passing over and upon such highways, excepting
road rollers, and such vehicles as travel exclusively on rails and
when and wherever the word automobile is used, it shall include
all vehicles that are propelled otherwise than by muscular power
excepting road rollers and such vehicles es travel exclusively on
rails."
The court erred in instructing the jury that under this act
the street car had the right of way. In a case of like facts,
Louisville Railway Co. v. Bridwell, 189 Ky. 424, it was held that
a street car conductor must use ordinary care to give east or
west bound vehicles the right of way. The court in that case
as in this held that the city ordinance, "All vehicles and street
ears going in an easterly and westerly direction shall have the
right of way over all the vehicles or street cars going in a north-
erly or southerly direction" in effect in Louisville at that time
controlled such cars and that the plaintiff was rightfully entitled
to damages. Louisville Ry Co. v. Everett, 199 Ky. 150.
J. W. C.
TORTS-RALROAD%--INFmM PERSON.-The deceased, a deaf
and dumb person, while walking on the defendant's track to-
wards an approaching train, was struck by it and killed. His
eyesight was good, the track was straight, and he could have
seen the train hhd he looked. The whistle was blown and the
brakes were -applied as soon as it was seen that the decedent was
not going to get off the tracks.
Those persons in charge of a train have a right to presume
that a person walking on a railroad will leave the tracks in time
to avoid injury from an approaching train of which he has
knowledge, or should have knowledge by the ordinary use of his
senses; and the managers may act on this presumption until the
contrary is indicated. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 99
Ill. App. 277; Capp v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 100 Me. 568; Hum-
Phrey's Adm'x v. Valley R. Co., 100 Va. 749; Shittevhelm's
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Adm'.r. v. L. & N. R. Co., 5 Ky. Law Reports 325; Redman's
Adrm'x, 28 Ky. Law Reports 1293.
The blowing of a whistle is sufficient warning and the com-
pany is not liable for his death, unless after discovering his in-
firmity or helplessness or that he did not intend to get out of the
way, the defendant's employees could have brought the train to
a stop before striking him. Parker v. Penn. Co., 134 Ind. 673;
Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Murphy, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 223;
Houstoin & T. C. By. Co. v. O'Donnell, 99 Tex. 636; L. & N. R.
Co. v. Cooper, 3 Ky. Law Reports, 624; Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P.
By. v. Marr's Admrx, 27 Ky. Law Reports 388. "And the doc-
trine is thoroughly established in this state that when a person
deprived of some of his senses goes upon a railroad track, he
must make up for a defective sense by being more vigilant in the
use of his unimpared senses. Nicholas' Adm'r v. L. & N. B. Co.,
9 Ky. Law Reports, 702; L. & N. R. Co. v. McCambs, 21 Ky. Law
Reports 1232.
In this case the plaintiff being infirm in his hearing was
guilty of contributory negligence in being upon the tracks and
not looking ahead for trains. And since those in charge of the
train, after discovering that the decedent did not intend to leave
the tracks, tried to stop the train with all available means, the
defendant can not be held liable. The Kentucky decisions are
in keeping with the majority view, and the judgment for the de-
fendant was affirmed. O'Dell's Adm'r v. Louisville & Nashville
By. Co., 200 Ky. 745. B.F.
W nis-ETATEs TAIL.-A will read as follows: "All resi-
due of my estate of every kind whatsoever, I give and bequeath
to my beloved daughter, Emma Howell Cox, to be held by her in
trust for my beloved wife, Emma 0. Howell, the interest and
earnings of which shall be paid to my said wife during her life-
time, and at her death all the residue thereof, after complying
with the provisions hereinbefore set forth, shall be given to my
said daughter, Emma Howell Cox, and to the heirs of her body."
The question involved is whether Emma Howell Cox has a fee
simple estate that she ca dispose of legally. Kentucky Statutes,
section 2343, declares that an estate that formerly was an estate
tail by the common law shall be held to be an estate in fee simple.
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With that statute in mind, the only question left to be deter-
mined is what words under the old law created an estate tail.
An estate tail may be described to be an estate of inherit-
ance deriving its existence from the statute do donis, which is
descendible to some particular heirs only of the person to whom
it is granted, and not to his heirs in general. 1 Cruise Dig. 78;
MoLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 441; Gray v. Gray, 20 Ga. 817; Jordan v.
Roach, 32 Mliss. 603; Prindle v. Beveridge, 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 228;
Smith v. Greer, 88 Ala. 414; Fisk v. Keene, 35 Me. 349;
Allon v. Ashby School Fund, 102 Mass. 262. The gift in the
present case is worded, "To Emma Howell Cox, and to the heirs
of her body." This gift would seem clearly to come within the
definition given -above. This is an estate of inheritance of the
kind that was first recognized by the statute de donis and it is de-
scendible to some particular heirs ("to the heirs of her body")
only of the person to whom granted. There is little or no con-
flict of authorities in defining what an estate tail is at common
law. And the words used in the principal case are clear and un-
ambiguous. Thus a determination can be reached, without
much trouble, that this gift would have created an estate tail at
common law. This section of the Kentucky Statutes declares
that all such estates as would be estates tail at common law
shall be held to be estates in fee simple. The instant case fol-
lows previous Kentucky decisions in holding that a devise to one
and the heirs of his body would, at common law, have created an
estate tail, by statute is converted into a fee. Eggner v. Have-
kanp, 134 Ky. 224; Bomnycastle v. Lily, 153 Ky. 834; Prescott
v. Prescott, 10 B. M. 56; Emma Howell Cox and Husband v.
F~ink and Jenson, 200 Ky. 219. Decided September 25, 1923.
E. E. S.
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THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION.
Announcement of the plans for the thirty-third conference
of the International Law Association of which the Earl of Read-
ing, Viceroy of India, is President, to be held in Stockholm, be-
ginning September S next, was made recently at the annual
meeting of the American branch of the association at the Uni-
versity Club. The conference at Stockholm is to be held after
the meeting of the American Bar Association in London in order
that many American lawyers who are members of the Interna-
tional Law Association may attend. The Government of Sweden
has made elaborate preparations to entertain the visiting law-
yers.
The Stockholm conference will receive reports from special
committies in various countries who have been working on a new
code of international law, but one of the most important subjects
to be considered is the subject of the protection of minorities
under the League of Nations and the Statute of Permanent In-
ternational Criminal Court. Reports will be received from the
committees of neutrality, foreign judgments, systems of evi-
dence, aviation, international organization, codification, nation-
ality and commercial arbitration.
The idea of an American branch originated with David Dud-
ley Field, draftsman of the Civil Code of New York State, and
Elihu Burritt Chief Justice Taft of the United States Supreme
Court was elected Honorary President of the American branch
at the recent meeting, and Amos J. Peaslee succeeded Dr. Arthur
K. Kuhn as Honorary Secretary.
Former Supreme Court Justice Harrington Putnam was
elected President. The other new officers are: Vice President,
Sir Robert Borden of Ottawa, Canada; Dr. Charles Noble Greg-
ory of Washington, D. C.; Everett P. Wheeler, John W. Davis
and Dr. Arthur K. Kuhn of New York; Treasurer, Ira H. Brain-
erd of New York and Chairman of the Executive Committee,
Edwin R. Keedy of Philadelphia.
(From the New York Times of February 4, 1924.)
